Moral Relativism and Perspectival Values by Gori, Pietro & Stellino, Paolo
Moral Relativism and Perspectival Values
Pietro Gori and Paolo Stellino
Although the term ‘relativism’ entered the philosophical vocabulary as 
a terminus technicus only in the nineteenth century,1 the philosophi-
cal position known as relativism can be traced back to Ancient Greek 
philosophy. As is known, the fundamental proposition of Protagoras of 
Abdera was that ‘man is the measure of all things: of the things which 
are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not.’ 
(Plato, Theaetetus: 152a) Socrates’ refusal of Protagoras’ proposition 
in the Theaetetus has led and still leads many philosophers to think that 
relativism is self-refuting:
[Protagoras’ doctrine] has this most exquisite feature: Protagoras admits, I pre-
sume, that the contrary opinion about his own opinion (namely, that it is false) 
must be true, seeing he agrees that all men judge what is … And in conceding the 
truth of the opinion of those who think him wrong, he is really admitting the fal-
sity of his own opinion? … But for their part the others do not admit that they are 
wrong? … But Protagoras again admits this judgement to be true, according to his 
written doctrine? … It will be disputed, then, by everyone, beginning with Pro-
tagoras – or rather, it will be admitted by him, when he grants to the person who 
contradicts him that he judges truly – when he does that, even Protagoras himself 
will be granting that neither a dog nor the ‘man in the street’ is the measure of 
1 Maria Baghramian (2004: 11) points out that the ﬁrst use of the term ‘relativism’ 
can be traced to John Grote’s Exploratio Philosophica (1865). Mi-Kyoung Lee 
(2005: 34), for his part, mentions an earlier use of the word in writings of Sir Wil-
liam Hamilton and puts forward the hypothesis that the term entered the English 
language from the German use of ‘Relativismus.’ As a matter of fact, as Bernd 
Irlenborn (2016: 7–8) indicates, the word ‘Relativismus’ can be already found in 
the ﬁfth volume of Wilhelm Traugott Krug’s Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der 
philosophischen Wissenschaften, dating from 1838. Lee (2005: 34) also points out 
that ‘Relativismus’ was the term used by nineteenth-century neo-Kantian German 
philosophers and scholars to refer to the position that nothing can be known in 
itself, and that all we can know are appearances.’
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anything at all which he has not learned. Isn’t that so? … Then since it is disputed 
by everyone, the Truth of Protagoras is not true for anyone at all, not even for 
himself? (Plato, Theaetetus: 171a-c)
Socrates draws attention to the fact that, if man is the measure of all 
things and, therefore, truth is relative to man, then Protagoras must con-
cede the truth of the opinion contrary to his own doctrine, namely the 
opinion according to which it is false that man is the measure of all 
things. By doing so, however, Protagoras would be contradictorily com-
mitted to both the truth and falsehood of his own doctrine. In order to 
avoid falling into this contradiction, Protagoras must assume that there 
is at least one absolute truth, that is, the truth of the proposition ‘man 
is the measure of all things.’ But then, once again, this could be seen as 
a contradictory move, for Protagoras would be maintaining at the same 
time that all truth is relative and that there is – at least – one absolute 
truth, namely, that all truth is relative.2
As Neil Levy (2002: 19) has pointed out, unlike epistemic relativ-
ism, moral relativism is not vulnerable to the contradiction argument. 
Indeed, no contradiction is involved in claiming that ‘moral claims are 
true only relative to some standard or framework’ since this is not it-
self a moral claim. Even so, moral relativism faces other di!culties. 
Above all, opponents of moral relativism claim that if moral relativism 
is true, then we have no means to condemn morally actions that we ﬁnd 
profoundly reprehensible or immoral if these actions are performed by 
members of a di"erent culture than ours. This claim usually takes the 
form of a slippery slope argument: if we recognize that a (we do not 
have any absolute moral standards in the name of which we can de-
nounce reprehensible or immoral actions), then the result b (the way is 
open for any kind of crime) inevitably follows. Moral relativism would 
thus fatally undermine morality: if moral relativism is true, so the crit-
icism goes, then anything goes, that is, everything is permitted. But is 
it really so? Does this way of framing the problem really capture the 
subtleties and complexities of moral relativism?
It is interesting to notice how the terms in which the debate be-
tween moral relativists and moral absolutists is phrased recall the way 
 
2 For a more detailed analysis, see Baghramian (2004: 18–31).
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in which philosophers have interpreted and still interpret the relation 
between Dostoevsky and Nietzsche. Needless to say, the argument ‘if 
moral relativism is true, then everything is permitted’ has a clear Dos-
toevskian ﬂavour. In Dostoevsky’s last novel The Brothers Karama-
zov, Ivan, one of the brothers Karamazov, puts forward the following 
idea: if there is no God and if there is no immortality of the soul, then 
everything is permitted. The parricide, around which the novel revolves, 
can be considered as a consequence of this idea, whereas the novel itself 
can be regarded as a grandiose response to it.
Ivan’s idea bears a striking similarity to the maxim ‘nothing is 
true, everything is permitted’ that appears in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, in On the Genealogy of Morality, as well as in some post-
humous fragments from 1884 and 1885. This similarity has not gone 
unobserved and, beginning from the end of the nineteenth century, 
Russian and European intellectuals have taken it as the key to read 
the relation between Dostoevsky and Nietzsche. The maxim ‘nothing 
is true, everything is permitted’ has been removed from context and 
read as summing up the core of Nietzsche’s philosophy. This has led to 
the controversial identiﬁcation of Nietzsche’s moral perspectivism with 
Ivan’s moral indierentism. As a result, Dostoevsky’s novel The Broth-
ers Karamazov has been seen as anticipation and critique ante litteram 
of Nietzsche’s perspectival philosophy.
Beyond the question of the philological and philosophical adequa-
cy of this kind of interpretation,3 what should not be overlooked here is 
the logic underlying this kind of reading. Far from questioning whether 
the maxim ‘nothing is true, everything is permitted’ could be taken as 
summing up the message of Nietzsche’s philosophy, intellectuals have 
taken for granted that the logical and inevitable conclusion following 
from Nietzsche’s moral perspectivism (essentially read as a moral rela-
tivism) was that ‘everything is permitted.’ As one can see, what we have 
is, once again, the argument according to which, if moral relativism – 
or, in Nietzsche’s case, moral perspectivism – is true, then everything 
is permitted.
In what follows, we will tackle this argument. More speciﬁcal-
ly, we will take Nietzsche’s case as paradigmatically showing that a 
3 On this, see the second part of Stellino (2015a).
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relativization or perspectivizing of morality does not imply ipso facto 
that anything goes or that everything is permitted. In order to do this, 
we will consider two assumptions which are often made uncritically: (1) 
Nietzsche’s moral perspectivism is essentially a moral relativism, and 
(2) the practical consequence deriving from Nietzsche’s moral perspec-
tivism is that everything is permitted.4
1. Moral Perspectivism
One of the aspects of Nietzsche’s thought that in recent years has cat-
alysed the attention of many scholars is ‘perspectivism.’ Although oc-
currences of this term are limited in number (at least, if we take into 
consideration only the oeuvre5) and time (they appear almost exclu-
sively in the late period), this notion has been taken as indicating one 
of the fundamental theories of his philosophy. The reason for the im-
portance that many scholars have given to this notion lies in the fact 
that perspectivism is considered as a key term used by Nietzsche to 
deﬁne, in a more synthetic and incisive way, his theory of knowledge. 
Within this context, scholars often focus on a famous passage from GM 
III 12 (‘There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival ‘know-
ing’’), but scarcely consider GS 354, where Nietzsche relates what he 
considers ‘to be true perspectivism’ with the morally-oriented view of 
 
4 Nietzsche’s works are cited by abbreviation, chapter (when applicable) and sec-
tion number. The abbreviations used are the following: BT (The Birth of Tragedy), 
HH (Human, All Too Human), GS (The Gay Science), Z (Thus Spoke Zarathus-
tra), BGE (Beyond Good and Evil), GM (On the Genealogy of Morality), TI (Twi-
light of the Idols), EH (Ecce Homo). The translations used are from the Cam-
bridge Edition of Nietzsche’s works. Posthumous fragments (PF) are identiﬁed 
with reference to the Colli & Montinari standard edition. The fragments which 
do not appear in the Cambridge Edition of the Writings from the Late Notebooks 
are translated according to the Kaufmann and Hollingdale edition of The Will to 
Power (see References).
5 See, particularly, BT, An Attempt at Self-Criticism 5; HH I, Preface 6; BGE, Pref-
ace and sections 11 and 34; GM III 12; FW 354 and 374.
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the herd community. Similarly, the posthumous note 7[60], 1886–87 is 
often mentioned, but most of the time it is misleadingly and arbitrarily 
quoted with no reference to its context.6 Since in this note Nietzsche’s 
aim is to criticize the attitude of positivism, scholars interpret the claim 
that ‘there are no facts, only interpretations’ – a statement often con-
sidered as summing up Nietzsche’s perspectivism – as being exclusive-
ly linked to epistemology. By so doing, the same scholars ignore that 
Nietzsche had already published the maxim in section 108 of Beyond 
Good and Evil (which chronologically predates the posthumous note 
7[60]) and that, in that book, the maxim was speciﬁcally referred to 
moral phenomena: ‘There are absolutely no moral phenomena, only a 
moral interpretation of the phenomena …’7 
This does not imply the rejection of the many interpretations that give 
preference to the epistemological character of Nietzsche’s reﬂections on 
perspectivism.8 Still, it is important to point out that, although Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism is grounded on a speciﬁc epistemological view, the former 
cannot be reduced to the latter. Nietzsche himself suggests this idea, for 
instance, when he argues that our fundamental ‘will to truth’ forces us to 
recognize that ‘it is no more than a moral prejudice that the truth is worth 
more than appearance’ (BGE 34; our italics). On the contrary, Nietzsche 
writes, we have to acknowledge that ‘life could not exist except on the basis 
of perspectival valuations and appearances.’
The maxim in BGE 108, which can be taken as the ‘motto’ of 
Nietzsche’s moral perspectivism, reappears two years later and in a 
slightly dierent way in the following passage from Twilight of the 
Idols:
6 For a thorough examination of this note, see Gori (2016: chapter 2).
7 See also PF 1885–86, 2[165]: ‘My main proposition: there are no moral phenom-
ena, there is only a moral interpretation of those phenomena. This interpretation 
is of extra-moral origin.’ We can ﬁnd perspectivism and morality strictly related in 
other posthumous fragments of Nietzsche’s (e.g. PF 1884, 26[178] and 1885–86, 
2[206]). In PF 1887, 10[154], Nietzsche writes: ‘My intention to show the abso-
lute homogeneity in all that happens and the application of the moral distinction 
as only perspectivally conditioned.’ According to Robert C. Solomon (2003: 46), 
‘Nietzsche’s ‘perspectivism’ is most in evidence and most at issue in his moral 
philosophy.’
8 On this, see, among others, Clark (1990) and Leiter (1994).
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You have heard me call for philosophers to place themselves beyond good and evil, 
– to rise above the illusion of moral judgement. This call is the result of an insight 
that I was the ﬁrst to formulate: there are absolutely no moral facts. What moral and 
religious judgements have in common is the belief in things that are not real. Mo-
rality is just an interpretation of certain phenomena or (more accurately) a misinter-
pretation. Moral judgements, like religious ones, presuppose a level of ignorance in 
which even the concept of reality is missing and there is no distinction between the 
real and the imaginary; a level where ‘truth’ is the name for the very things that we 
now call ‘illusions’. That is why moral judgements should never be taken literally: 
on their own, they are just absurdities. (TI, ‘Improving’ Humanity 1)9
According to Nietzsche, to deny the very existence of moral facts (or 
phenomena) means to deny the possibility of claiming that the same 
facts (or phenomena) are intrinsically moral. In Nietzsche’s view, re-
ality is morally neutral. To believe that there are moral realities is 
the consequence of an illusion: what we do have is the existence of 
facts or phenomena, to which a moral interpretation is added by us 
depending on the speciﬁc moral perspective from which we judge. 
According to Nietzsche, the moral character of an action has thus not 
been found or discovered, but rather introduced in the action by the 
human being.
Here we face the question of the so-called Sinn hineinlegen, i.e. the 
‘introduction of meaning’ into the world. As Nietzsche puts it in a well-
known passage from section 301 of The Gay Science:
It is we, the thinking-sensing ones, who really and continually make something 
that is not yet there: the whole perpetually growing world of valuations, colours, 
weights, perspectives, scales, a!rmations, and negations. … Whatever has value 
in the present world has it not in itself, according to its nature – nature is always 
value-less – but has rather been given, granted value, and we were the givers 
and granters! Only we have created the world that concerns human beings! But 
precisely this knowledge we lack, and when we catch it for a moment we have 
forgotten in the next.
As this passage clearly shows, Nietzsche maintains a projectivist stance 
on valuations.10 The world appears to be valuable and meaningful 
9 This passage is often quoted in order to support a reading of Nietzsche’s metaeth-
ics in the light of J.L. Mackie’s ‘error theory’ (see, for instance, Hussain 2007).
10 On this, see Stellino (2015b: 182–184).
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because human beings previously gave value and meaning to a value-
less and meaningless world. In other words, they projected moral, aes-
thetic, religious and other kinds of valuations and estimations onto it. 
By so doing, they created a perspectival and anthropomorphic world 
and then forgot about their creation, wrongly believing the world to be 
intrinsically beautiful and meaningful.11
The awareness of the intrinsic meaninglessness of the world 
strongly characterizes Nietzsche’s late philosophical thought. Whereas 
philosophers so far searched for a meaning of or in the world, Nietzsche 
becomes conscious that meaning or value has to be created. This crea-
tion opens up new, unexplored possibilities for the human being: this is 
the ultimate meaning of the metaphors of the ‘new dawn’ and the ‘open 
sea’ that Nietzsche uses in order to describe the free spirit’s reaction to 
the news that ‘the old God is dead’ (GS 343). ‘The world has once again 
become inﬁnite to us,’ Nietzsche writes in another section of the ﬁfth 
book of The Gay Science, ‘insofar as we cannot reject the possibility 
that it includes infinite interpretations’ (GS 374).
A superﬁcial reading of Nietzsche’s philosophy could take these 
passages and metaphors as a conﬁrmation that the reasoning men-
tioned above – according to which, if moral perspectivism is true, then 
everything is permitted – is validated by Nietzsche himself. As a matter 
of fact, if, according to Nietzsche’s moral perspectivism, (i) every moral 
interpretation is relative to a judging perspective, and (ii) God is dead, 
that is, an absolute viewpoint (God’s eye view) is lacking, then (iii) 
every moral interpretation seems to be as true, valid or justiﬁed as the 
others. In other words, everything would be permitted. Following this 
reasoning, Nietzsche is often interpreted as a supporter of an extreme 
moral relativism as well as of a radical form of normative ethical ego-
ism according to which, given God’s death and the perspectival charac-
ter of reality, moral agents ought to do what is their own self-interest, 
even if this means to act in detriment to others’ interest. In what follows, 
attention will be brieﬂy focused on both views.
11 See also PF 1884, 25[505].
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2. Individualism vs. Relationalism
In arguing against the view that takes Nietzsche to be a supporter of a 
radical form of normative ethical egoism, the following premise is need-
ed: it is undeniable that in Nietzsche’s writings and posthumous notes 
one ﬁnds abundant textual evidence in favour of moral individualism. In 
a passage from Thus spoke Zarathustra, for instance, Nietzsche writes as 
follows: ‘He will have discovered himself who speaks: ‘This is my good 
and evil.’ With this he has silenced the mole and dwarf who says: ‘Good 
for all, evil for all’.’ (Z IV, On the Spirit of Gravity) This individualistic 
attitude – a peculiar feature of Nietzsche’s philosophy – acquires its full 
meaning when contrasted with Kantian universalism. This contrast, in 
particular, is symbolised by the second metamorphosis of the spirit, who 
ﬁrst becomes a camel (‘Thou shalt’) and then a lion (‘I will’).12
It is because of his strong opposition to Kantian universalism that 
Nietzsche puts particular emphasis, in Zarathustra as well as in other 
writings, on the point of view of the individual in morality. This empha-
sis has been, however, interpreted in the sense of a radical and extreme 
form of individualism, which would directly follow from Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism. Nevertheless, although Nietzsche often makes reference 
to the human tendency to subjugate and tyrannize – a tendency which is 
the expression of the fundamental feature of the world, the well-known 
and widely debated ‘will to power’ – the perspectival talk of a mul-
tiplicity of dierent and opposed perspectives leads to quite dierent 
outcomes. This becomes evident when attention is focused on the key 
question of the subject of perspectivism.13
Contrary to what one may be led to believe, most of the time 
Nietzsche does not identify the human being (the individual) as the 
proper subject of perspectivism; rather, he refers both to supra-in-
dividual subjects (e.g. the species or society) and to infra-individu-
al subjects (e.g. the centres of force). Moreover, no matter which is 
the subject of perspectivism (the individual, the supra-individual or 
12 Z, I, On the Three Metamorphoses. See also GS 355, A 11, and TI, Morality as 
Anti-nature 6.
13 On this, see Cox (1997).
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the infra-individual one), the reality lying behind it is always plural 
and dynamic. This reality is characterised by the mutual relation-
ship between its component parts, according to the view of nature 
that Nietzsche defends as from 1881.14 Nietzsche’s perspectivism is, 
therefore, grounded on a relational model with no privileged subject. 
Within this model, the validity of one speciﬁc perspective cannot be 
thought without any reference to the relation (be it conﬂicting or not) 
that this perspective entertains with other perspectives.
A brief scrutiny of the most interesting passages where Nietzsche 
talks about a ‘perspectival seeing’ can lend support to what has been 
argued. The wider subject of perspectivism that Nietzsche considers is 
the species, whose perspective on, or interpretation of, reality is shared 
by all the single individuals that have the same perceptive and cognitive 
apparatus. Nietzsche has in mind what we could deﬁne as a collective 
subject on a biological basis. During its evolutionary history, every spe-
cies has developed a particular psycho-physiological structure which 
is functional to adaptation to the environment. Although each member 
of the species has a speciﬁc viewpoint of the world, she is still part of 
a wider interpreting perspective of reality which is the result of similar 
perceptive mechanisms.15
Nietzsche follows a similar line of thought when it comes to anoth-
er wide subject of perspectivism, namely the social collectivity. In the 
well-known section 354 from the ﬁfth book of The Gay Science – the 
only section of the published texts in which Nietzsche uses the term 
‘perspectivism’ and explains what he considers to be ‘true phenome-
nalism and perspectivism’ – attention is focused on communication as a 
prerequisite for the creation of a society. In particular, Nietzsche points 
out that human consciousness ‘actually belongs not to man’s existence 
as an individual but rather to the community- and herd-aspects of his 
nature.’ The herd is here the subject of a generalized and vulgarized 
14 On Nietzsche’s view of the world as an unresting dynamics of force-quanta in 
mutual relationship, and on the connection between this ontology and the idea of 
‘will to power,’ see Abel (1998) and Gori (2007: chapter 3).
15 On this, see, e.g. GS 110; PF 1885, 43[1] and 5[36]; PF 1886, 7[2]. George Stack 
particularly focuses on the species as the main reference of Nietzsche’s perspec-
tivism. See, for instance, Stack (1991). See also Cox (1997: 274–275).
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perspective, a dimension where any individual feeling and willing loses 
its value in favour of the usefulness to the herd.16
Species and society are two plural subjects of perspectivism in 
which individuality plays no fundamental role. On the contrary, when 
it comes to the human being – considered as the referent of a singular 
perspective determined not only by its space-time perception, but also 
by its speciﬁc interests and needs – individuality obviously has a more 
important position.17 On this level, we have a multiplicity of singular 
perspectives pertaining to individual subjects whose fundamental ten-
dency, according to Nietzsche, is to a!rm their own worldview (their 
own ‘taste’) over those of the other subjects. This picture can particu-
larly lead to the dangerous idea that Nietzsche is a supporter of a rad-
ical form of normative ethical egoism for, given this conﬂictive pic-
ture, moral agents could seem to be justiﬁed in doing what is their own 
self-interest, even if this means to act in detriment to others’ interest.
Without denying that, in Nietzsche’s view, individual perspec-
tives conﬂict with each other and often tend to overmaster di"erent or 
opposite perspectives, it should be pointed out that this interpretation 
su"ers one serious ﬂaw: it overlooks the constitutive character that re-
lationalism plays in Nietzsche’s perspectivism. As already mentioned, 
Nietzsche considers the individual as always making part of a species 
or a social collectivity. Within both of them, the individual is not like a 
monad, but is rather situated in a network of dynamic and interpersonal 
relations. Moreover, even when emphasis is put on the individual, it 
should not be forgotten that Nietzsche conceives the individual itself in 
terms of a plural multiplicity, a collectivity. This is evident, for instance, 
in Beyond Good and Evil, where Nietzsche’s criticism towards the tra-
ditional view of the substantialist concept of ‘subject’ makes reference 
to ‘social structures’ like the soul, ‘a society constructed out of drives 
and a"ects’ (BGE 12), or the body, made of many souls from which 
the action that we call ‘individual’ arises (BGE 19).18 Thus, behind the 
16 See on this Ibbeken (2008: 75) and Gori (2016: chapter 3).
17 Among others, Clark and Leiter argue that Nietzsche’s perspectivism is limited to 
human consciousness only. Their view is discussed in Cox (1997: 276 "). On this, 
see also (Grimm 1977: 68). 
18 See also PF 1880, 6[70]. According to Nietzsche, individuals are plural subjec-
tivities made of drives and instincts acting at an ‘unconscious’ level (see, e.g. PF 
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individual, as well as behind the species and the social collectivity, there 
lies a network of relations between singularities, singularities that we 
ignore in favour of a more unitary and inclusive perspective.
What emerges from this picture is a plural conception of the hu-
man being: on the one side, we ﬁnd a supraindividual (biological and/
or social) perspective that includes the individual one; on the other side, 
there is the plane of the single entities that constitute the human being 
and that ﬁnd in him a (merely illusory) unity.19 Behind these entities, 
there is the last subject that it is possible to ﬁnd in Nietzsche’s writings, 
namely the single centre of force.20 Here, Nietzsche leads perspectiv-
ism to the extreme, considering that the plane of interpretation coin-
cides with that of being, that is, with the plane of pure and necessary re-
lationship among the dierent perspectives, which can be deﬁned only 
from within their mutual relation:
As if a world would still remain over after one deducted the perspective! By do-
ing that one would deduct relativity! Every center of force adopts a perspective 
toward the entire remainder, i.e., its own particular valuation, mode of action, and 
mode of resistance. … The ‘world’ is only a word for the totality of these actions. 
Reality consists precisely in this particular action and reaction of every individual 
part toward the whole. (PF 1888, 14[184])
As the analysis developed shows, when Nietzsche talks of ‘perspectiv-
ism’ or ‘perspectival seeing,’ he always has in mind a relational dynamics. 
The dierent interpretations of the world (be they of theoretical or moral 
nature) are all expression of this dynamics, on the basis of which the in-
ternal articulation of the most complex structures existing in the world is 
grounded. Everything is based on a non-teleological and necessary, but 
constitutively unstable, action-reaction process. Value judgments can be 
deﬁned only by reference to this relationship, where, at the micro-level, 
a centre of force gains ‘power’ only insofar as it exchanges energy with 
1885, 40[42]). Within this picture, the I (or the subject) is a non-substance entity, 
a theoretical notion whose ontological ground is only that of the pure activity that 
we attribute to it. In other words, the I is ‘a perspectival illusion – the illusory uni-
ty in which, as in a horizon, everything converges’ (PF 1885–86, 2[91]; on this, 
see also BGE 16, 17 and 19, and, for an examination of this issue, Gori 2015).
19 On this, see Cox (1997: 290).
20 See, among others, PF 1888, 14[184] and [186].
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other centres. The kind of mastery grounded on this relationship is there-
fore not ﬁxed and immutable. On the contrary, once the power of a centre 
of force is exhausted, the equilibrium of the total mass of energy changes 
and another centre becomes ‘master’ for a limited period of time.
The reference to this dynamic relationship avoids the risk of inter-
preting Nietzsche’s moral perspectivism as leading to a form of autar-
chic individualism. The idea that dierent, conﬂicting interpretations 
can coexist follows indeed from the view according to which relation-
ship itself is the constitutive element of a perspectival reality. In other 
words, we cannot deﬁne the centres of force outside their mutual rela-
tions or without making reference to the way they react to the obstacles 
they ﬁnd when they discharge their energy. As a result, every perspec-
tive can a!rm itself only through the relation with the other ones and, 
furthermore, in alternation with them. Thus, it would be wrong to think 
that, within Nietzsche’s worldview, a speciﬁc evaluative perspective 
could be valid in itself, that is, in isolation from a context that gives to it 
its speciﬁc meaning, or to claim that one can a!rm his own view over 
the others once and for all. This does not amount to any rejection of the 
individualistic and a!rmative tendency pertaining to each perspective. 
Still, it is important to emphasize that this tendency must face the same 
attempt of a!rmation from other subjects. In this way, conﬂicting per-
spectives give birth to a relational dynamics.21
3. Relativism
Nietzsche’s moral perspectivism has been interpreted not only as an ex-
treme form of ethical egoism, but also as a radical relativism according 
to which, as mentioned, since (i) every moral interpretation is relative to 
a judging perspective, and (ii) an absolute viewpoint is lacking, then (iii) 
21 L. Hatab (1995: 160) argues that Nietzsche’s pluralistic perspectivism is dierent 
from any other view that defends the coexistence of multiple ‘truths’ because it 
puts emphasis on the agonal dimension, that is, on the conﬂict existing between 
dierent perspectives. Nietzsche’s perspectival view has been used by Günter Abel 
in order to develop an ‘interpretation ethics’ (see e.g. Abel 1995: chapter 24).
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every moral interpretation seems to be as true, valid or justiﬁed (i.e. per-
mitted) as the others. In order to understand why this kind of reading fails 
to capture the real meaning of the radical change that Nietzsche operates 
in the realm of morality, it is necessary to focus attention on the main 
goal of Nietzsche’s late philosophy. The death of God announced by the 
madman of The Gay Science (§ 125), together with the collapse of the 
Christian-moral interpretation of the world, leave an axiological and nor-
mative void. Far from accepting this void as an inevitable existential con-
dition, Nietzsche aims to face it ‘fearless’ and ‘cheerful’ (GS 343), and 
to ﬁll it through the well-known revaluation of values. It is symptomatic, 
for instance, that although, on the one hand, Zarathustra (Nietzsche’s alter 
ego) presents himself as ‘the annihilator of morals’ (Z I, On the Adder’s 
Bite), on the other hand he puts strong emphasis on the need of creating 
new values. In other words, Nietzsche is well aware that a new evaluative 
interpretation must take the place of the former one, and much of his 
eort in the late period is focused on elaborating this new interpretation.
The attitude that, in the ﬁfth book of The Gay Science, Nietzsche 
claims to be that of the new philosophers and ‘good Europeans’ shows 
us that, according to him, one of the consequences of the death of God 
is the opening of what Karl Jaspers has deﬁned as a ‘positive, creative 
freedom’ (Jaspers 1997: 157) for the human being. In the posthumous 
fragment 39[15], 1885, Nietzsche clearly writes that, with the death of 
God, the Christian-European morality has become no longer necessary 
(the Christian God and morality held themselves together, he claims). 
Once traditional morality has been denied validity, Nietzsche exhorts 
the human being to become a self-legislator, that is, to give himself 
new values and ideals and to set new goals (GS 335). In other words, 
man must become autonomous. This autonomy, however, is not to be 
conceived in terms of an unlimited or licentious freedom.22 The con-
sequence of the death of God is rather an assumption of both individ-
ual and collective responsibility.23 This is a key point which Heidegger 
(2002 [1943]: 189) did not fail to notice, as the following passage clear-
ly shows:
22 See on this e.g. Constâncio (2012).
23 On this, see Pfeu!er (2008).
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It is easy but irresponsible to be outraged by the idea and the ﬁgure of the over-
man, which was designed to be misunderstood; it is easy but irresponsible to 
pretend that one’s outrage is a refutation. It is dicult but for future thinking 
unavoidable to attain the high responsibility [hohe Verantwortung; our italics] out 
of which Nietzsche reﬂected on the essence of that humanity destined … to un-
dertake mastery over the earth. The essence of the overman is not a warrant for a 
ﬁt of capricious frenzy. It is the law, grounded in being itself, of a long chain of 
the highest self-overcomings.
With these words, Heidegger gets at the heart of the problem: the axio-
logical and normative void left by the death of God and by the collapse 
of the Christian-moral interpretation of the world is not conceived by 
Nietzsche as a ‘warrant for a ﬁt of capricious frenzy,’ to use Heidegger’s 
words. On the contrary, as already mentioned, Nietzsche calls humanity 
to an assumption of individual and collective responsibility, that is, to 
an attainment of the awareness that, since humanity’s great values and 
ideals have proved to be hollow, new values and ideals are now required, 
i.e. must be created.24
This is the chief reason for which Dostoevsky’s and Nietzsche’s an-
swer to the question of the consequence of the death of God for moral-
ity could not be more opposite. As The Brothers Karamazov exemplary 
shows, Dostoevsky believes that God’s existence and the immortality of 
the soul are two essential pillars of the moral ediﬁce. Without them, what 
we have is a dangerous slope that leads from atheism to self-deiﬁcation, 
and from self-deiﬁcation to the breaking of all moral rules. This logic 
becomes evident in the following passage from the dialogue between the 
devil and Ivan Karamazov (fourth part of the novel): 
Once mankind has renounced God, one and all … then the entire old world view 
will fall of itself, without anthropophagy, and, above all, the entire former moral-
ity, and everything will be new. … Man will be exalted with the spirit of divine, 
titanic pride, and the man-god will appear. … The question now … is whether or 
not it is possible for such a period ever to come. If it does come, then everything 
will be resolved and mankind will ﬁnally be settled. But since, in view of man’s 
inveterate stupidity, it may not be settled for another thousand years, anyone who 
already knows the truth is permitted to settle things for himself, absolutely as 
he wishes, on the new principles. In this sense, ‘everything is permitted’ to him. 
Moreover, since God and immortality do not exist in any case, even if this period 
24 See PF 1887, 11[411].
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should never come, the new man is allowed to become a man-god, though it be he 
alone in the whole world, and of course, in this new rank, to jump lightheartedly 
over any former moral obstacle of the former slave-man, if he need be. There is 
no law for God! (Dostoevsky 1992: 648f.)
Unlike Dostoevsky, for Nietzsche the dichotomy ‘either God or amoral-
ity’ is a false dichotomy. Aware that, to put it with Kant (1998 [1786]: 
12), ‘without any law, nothing – not even nonsense – can play its 
game for long,’ Nietzsche is far from being a supporter of the thesis 
‘everything is permitted,’ at least when this thesis is understood as an 
absolute lack of laws and values. If so understood, this thesis leads in-
deed to the nihilistic attitude that Nietzsche diagnoses in the European 
culture of his own age (with its degenerative eect on humanity) and 
to whose opposition a large part of his late writings and Nachlass is 
dedicated. On the contrary, as one can read, e.g. in On the Genealogy 
of Morality (III, 27), Nietzsche shows a clear awareness of the fact that 
European nihilism can and has to be countered with a revaluation of 
values. This is the groundbreaking task that Nietzsche decides to face, 
as he himself confesses in his autobiography: ‘I have a hand for switch-
ing perspectives: the ﬁrst reason why a ‘revaluation of values’ is even 
possible, perhaps for me alone’ (EH, Why I Am So Wise, 1).
One of the fundamental conditions of the new ‘doctrine and coun-
ter-evaluation of life’ to which Nietzsche makes reference in the new 
preface to The Birth of Tragedy (BT, An Attempt at Self-Criticism, 5) is, 
without doubt, the acknowledgment of the perspectival character of ex-
istence. This acknowledgment poses a classical problem to Nietzsche, 
namely that of the conﬂict between dierent moralities or dierent tables 
of values. Since there is no one absolute morality, but rather a plurality of 
(often conﬂicting) moral perspectives, how can one perspective claim to 
be better than another? Here, again, relativism seems to cast its shadow 
and one may be led to believe that there is no plausible alternative to the 
position according to which every moral interpretation seems to be as 
true, valid or justiﬁed (i.e. permitted) as the others. However, this would 
be wrong. Indeed, Nietzsche defends the idea that it is possible – in fact, 
according to him, necessary – to establish a rank order among values, 
valuations, men, individuals, types, aects, drives, forces, goods, types of 
life, societies and cultures. The Nachlass bears abundant testimony that 
this is one of the most pressing tasks of Nietzsche’s late philosophy. In 
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particular, the problem of values and the establishment of the rank order 
of values are considered by Nietzsche as the future task of the philosopher, 
as the following passage from the Genealogy of Morality clearly shows:
The question: what is this or that table of values and ‘morals’ worth? needs to be 
asked from dierent angles; in particular, the question ‘value for what?’ cannot 
be examined too ﬁnely. … The good of the majority and the good of the minority 
are conﬂicting moral standpoints: we leave it to the naïvety of English biologists 
to view the first as higher in value as such … All sciences must, from now on, pre-
pare the way for the future work of the philosopher: this work being understood 
to mean that the philosopher has to solve the problem of values and that he has to 
decide on the rank order of values. –
There is little doubt that Nietzsche’s attempt to establish a rank order 
of perspectival values is problematic. Brian Leiter (2000: 277), for 
example, in his paper on Nietzsche’s metaethics, poses the following 
question: ‘is there any sense in which Nietzsche’s evaluative perspec-
tive can claim some epistemic privilege – being veridical, being better 
justified – over its target?’25 In other words, as John Richardson (2004: 
68) points out, Nietzsche’s attempt to establish a rank order of values 
generates an interpretive puzzle: how can Nietzsche reconcile his ‘em-
phatic ‘perspectivizing’ of all values, including his own, with his equal-
ly vehement ‘ranking’ of values – a ranking that so clearly purports to 
some privileged status?’26 To provide an answer to these questions goes 
 
25 Leiter seems not to take into consideration the possibility that the privilege 
claimed by Nietzsche’s evaluative perspective is not epistemic, but rather prac-
tical. See, for instance, Gerhardt 1989. On the primary function of every per-
spective as sinnorientierend, that is, as providing a meaning though which the 
human being can be practically orientated in the world, see Kaulbach (1980) and 
Gerhardt (1989).
26 Another way to put the problem is the following: how do we reconcile the me-
taethics of the values Nietzsche criticizes and the metaethics of the values he 
defends? As Robertson (2009: 67) puts it, ‘If Nietzsche denies the objectivity of 
value upon which morality’s claim to authority rests, he thereby deprives his own 
positive values of a legitimate claim to objectivity and authority; in that case, the 
values constitutive of his own positive evaluative outlook are no more objectively 
justified than or superior to those he rejects; there may then be no objective justi-
fication for the claim that we should alter our evaluative commitments or pursue 
the revaluation through to completion.’ On this, see Stellino (2015b).
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beyond the scope of this paper. However, within the present context, we 
may observe that Nietzsche’s insistence on the need of a rank order pre-
cisely constitutes the chief objection against those readings that equate 
Nietzsche’s moral perspectivism with a moral relativism according to 
which all evaluative perspectives would have the same status or the 
same validity. For if Nietzsche would consider all evaluative perspec-
tives to have the same status or the same validity, why would he feel the 
urgent need to establish a rank order of values?
Werner Stegmaier (1994: 202) stresses quite clearly Nietzsche’s 
original attitude towards relativism:
According to Nietzsche, to think in a relativistic way means to search for a hold 
no longer on any highest point – with which, if proved to be untenable, everything 
would break down – but rather on a network of relations which maintain their 
hold on one another. For Nietzsche, nihilism was the groundless-becoming of 
every higher philosophy of absolute, while the relativism of his perspectivism 
was the disillusion that had to follow and a relief. Philosophy could now give up 
the search for ultimate criteria for the foundation of truth and good and, instead, 
explore the changing plausibilities according to which we generally validate truth 
as truth, good as good and grounded [Begründen] as grounded. 
In this passage, Stegmaier particularly focuses on the connection be-
tween relativism and what we have deﬁned as ‘relationalism,’ and 
stresses the importance of considering values and truths as generated 
by ‘a network of relations which maintain their hold on one another’ 
instead of with reference to a single, absolute principle. If we take this 
viewpoint, then it is easy to understand how a relativization or a per-
spectivizing of morality – which is Nietzsche’s case – does not imply 
ipso facto that anything goes or that everything is permitted. As we 
have seen above, Nietzsche is highly aware that the risk of defending a 
perspectival view in the moral domain is that all evaluative perspectives 
can be considered to have the same status or the same validity, but he 
also defends a relationalistic view according to which each truth, each 
value can be judged only with reference to the network of which they 
are part. In short, Nietzsche thinks that there should be (or there has to 
be) a rank order of values and, furthermore, that the criterion or stand-
ard, which has to be deﬁned in order to establish this rank order, must 
take into account the relationalism of values. Thus, the rank order of 
values cannot be grounded on some kind of individualistic principle or 
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normative ethical egoism.27 As Nietzsche suggests in the passage from 
the Genealogy mentioned above, to deﬁne this criterion constitutes the 
future work of the philosopher.
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